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Abstract
Starting from Adam Smith's intuition, compensating wage dierentials are
one of the most widespread explanation to describe why agents should bear oc-
cupational risk of injury and death. For nearly thirty years, economists have
attempted to nd empirical evidence on such wage dierentials mostly relying
on estimation of a simple wage equation. This paper claims to put one step
forward. Using the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 2004 we
estimate for Italy the wage premium held by workers in risky occupations by
means of the matching estimator. Such technique is desirable because it at-
tempts to remove all the dierences in wage coming from heterogeneity across
individuals and not directly imputable to risk. Estimates suggest that net hourly
wage premium is about 3% to manual workers and nearly null to non-manual
workers. When we split the sample along the employer size, our ndings show a
heterogeneous treatment with respect to occupational status. Small rms tend
to 
atten out any risk premium to manual workers, while they recognize roughly
6% to non-manual workers; the opposite occurs when we look at medium-large
rms wherein manual workers gain 1.5% to 5% more with respect their coun-
terparts. Therefore, it seems that wage-risk tradeo does not always emerge as
hedonic wage theory would predict.
Keywords: wage dierentials; risky jobs; value of a statistical life; propensity score
matching.
JEL classication: C14; J31; J28; I19.
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11 Introduction
In Italy, the political debate about job safety is particular widespread especially in
recent years. Despite Italian legislation obliges employer to take measures to prevent
dangerous happening to the workers and thereby to reduce the probability of being
injured, Italy is experiencing a signicant rate of injury and death in workplace, with
an average of more than 3 deaths per day (Inail, 2007) and with a non negligible
proportion of workers that experience at least one injury in workplace in a year (3.7%
in 2007) (ISTAT, 2008). The highest gures concern workers aged 35-44, males, non-
native workers and blue-collars, while, with regard to economic sector, constructions,
manufacturing and transports are the riskiest.
Irrespective of the ecacy of italian legislation to reduce risk on the job place, it
is interesting to inquire whether bearing the risk is at least compensated by a higher
wage. This intuition is very old in economic theory and it is known as the hedonic wage
theory. According to Adam Smith, dierences in wages re
ect dierences in the labor
characteristics, such as arduousness, honorableness, dierent quality components of
the job and so forth, as well as workers' productivity. In that framework, a risky job
position should be compensated by dierences in wage rate. Labor market, then, can
be viewed as providing a mechanism for implicit trading in risk, with the degree of
risk varying from one job to another.
The idea that a risky job should be paid more is also present in the health economic
literature which highlights the risk premium as a component, perhaps the main one,
of the so-called value of life, that is, how much people care about their own safety
(Viscusi 2003b; Rosen, 2004). In a sense, wage risk premium can be viewed as the
market value of the risk and it has been the subject of many empirical investigations
about the value of a statistical life (see the comprehensive review of Viscusi, 2003b).
Both labour economics and health economics approach to estimate such a risk
premium has followed, in the last two decades, the hedonic wage framework. Finding
empirical evidence of such wage dierentials, however, it is problematic, given the
diculty to disentangle the pure wage risk premium, if any, from other factors that
aect wages, as unobserved workers' ability, rm size and/or rm industry-specic
dierentials and so forth. Even if one controls for both workers' productivity and dif-
ferent quality components of the job, endogeneity and sample selection issues might
aect the estimates. These pitfalls turn out to be noteworthy if one consider that the
statistical approach mainly used so far has been the canonical mincerian equation,
which is well recognized to release biased estimates, due to the existence of unob-
servable traits of the workers to the researcher. As a result, it has not been always
straightforward to derive a clear-cut causal relationship between risky job and wage.
2In this paper we attempt to cope with some of these diculties, estimating wage
dierentials between risky and non-risky jobs by means of a matching estimators,
never used in empirical literature on risk premium so far. Such a technique seems
desirable because it enables us to infer causal relationship between the "treatment",
holding a risky position, and the "outcome", hourly wage, if there exists selection on
observables and, in this way, it allows us to overcome both the bias of OLS estimates
and sample selection bias (Heckman et al., 1998; Blundell et al., 2002) .
Using data from Italy, drawing from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW) 2004, we nd that wage risk premium, is quite small and not always rec-
ognized compared to other countries (amongst others see Biddle and Zarkin, 1998,
Hersch, 1983 for US, Lalive 2000 for Austria). Hourly wage premium is about 3% to
manual workers and nearly null to non-manual workers. When we split the sample
along the employer size, results suggest a heterogeneous treatment with respect to
occupational status. Small rms tend to 
atten out any risk premium to manual
workers, while they recognize roughly 6% to non-manual workers; the opposite occurs
when we look at medium-large rms wherein manual workers gain 1.5% to 5% more
with respect their counterparts.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provide a simple theoretical
framework of compensating wage dierentials. Section 3 highlights the econometric
strategy. Section 4 describes the data and provides summary statistics of the variables
that we used in the econometric analysis. The last section shows results and gives
some nal remarks.
2 Theoretical Framework
A good example to sketch the theoretical framework underlain our empirical in-
vestigation is the basic illustration provided by Viscusi (2003b). Consider that risk
to be transacted in the market; the market price of a unit of risk is the wage pre-
mium an individual would be willing to forgo to engage in an occupation with a lower
probability of death or severe injury. Firms and workers then exchange wage-job risk
bundles (w;r) within an implicit labour market.
Consider that workers' decision about their supply of labour depends on both
wage as well as the level of risk they are exposed. Let U(w) represent the von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function of a healthy worker at wage w and
V (w) represent the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function of a in-
jured worker at wage w. Further, assume that workers prefer to be healthy than
injured, i.e. U(w) > V (w) and that the marginal utility of wage is positive, i.e.












Figure 1: Long-run competitive equilibrium for compensating dierentials.
expected utility are such that the following holds:
(1   r)U(w) + rV (w) = u (1)
The above indierence curve is showed in gure (1) and labeled as EU1 for worker
1 and EU2 for worker 2 (worker 2 is unambiguously more prone to job risk).
Firms' demand for labor is decreasing with the total cost of employing a worker.
Considering that the cost of a worker includes the costs of providing a safe working
environment, the cost of employing a worker is thus increasing with the level of safety
provided. As a result, for a given level of prot, rms must pay less workers with
a safer working conditions. This is represented by an increasing oer curve in the
wage-risk space. Fig. (1) displays two rms with wage-risk oer curves OC1 and
OC2. The envelope of those oer curves detects then the market opportunities locus
w(r).
Workers maximize expected utility choosing the wage-risk combination along the
market opportunities locus w(r). As a result, worker 1's optimal job risk choice is the
4tangency between EU1 and rm 1's oer curve OC1; worker 2 maximizes expected
utility at the tangency between EU2 and OC2.
Dierentiating equation (1) with respect to w and r it can be shown that the wage




U(w)   V (w)
(1   r)U0(w) + rV 0(w)
> 0 (2)
All these points of tangency re
ect the joint in
uence of supply and demand of
labour and thus the observed wage-risk tradeo is only a local measure for marginal
changes in risk. Non-marginal changes in risk must be made along the worker's
expected utility locus and not the envelope w(r). For instance, if individual 1 is
exposed to risk r2 the optimal wage choice must be detected on EU1, thus worker 2
should be paid more than individual 2 at same risk r2. It is worth pointing out that
the only thing that we can observe and then estimate is the marginal changes in risk,
which are expected to be positively associated with wage as showed above.
3 Econometric Strategy
The aim here is to show and explain our choice of using the method of matching in
such a framework. In the discussion we strongly relate to the evaluation and selection
literature (see Heckman et al., 1999 amongst others). One might see the estimation
problem in the risk wage dierentials framework as synonymous with the construction
of a counter-factual in the evaluation literature. Assuming that the treatment status
is "working in a very risky job" we are interested to construct the counter-factual
of interest "working in a non-risky job" for the same individuals, thus, according to
some observable characteristics, we are able to recover the missing information on
the outcomes of the treated had they not been treated and, by means of that, get an
estimate of the wage risk premium.
To show the importance of constructing the counterfactual, consider the following
model. Let Ti be the treatment index, Ti = 1 stands for worker employed in a very
risky job and Ti = 0 worker employed in non-risky job. For any individuals i in the
set of individuals that receives the treatment the earnings outcome is:
ln!1
i = i + iTi + i for i 2 fTi = 1g:
Whereas if the same individual were not to receive the treatment, that is, he is
not employed in a risky job their earnings outcome would be:
ln!0
i = i + i for i 2 fTi = 0g
5the superscript 0 refers to the counter-factual earnings of an individual i for whom
Ti = 1 in the observed data. If we could observe both outcomes for all individuals for







where n1 is the number of individuals for whom Ti = 1 in a random sample of size n,
would be a consistent estimate of the average treatment on the treated eect T, i. e.,
average wage risk premium of holding a very risky job. In a randomized experiment
the control group is chosen independently of i;i and i by design, as a result
the average treatment eect can be measured straightforwardly from a comparison
of the control group and the treatment group. As we use non-experimental data,
and we do not observe both outcomes for all individuals for whom Ti = 1, we need
to construct the control group. We do that through the method of matching. It
attempts to mimic an experiment by choosing a comparison group from all the non-
treated such that the selected group is as similar as possible to the treatment group
in terms of their observable characteristics. Under the matching assumption1 that all
the outcome-relevant dierences between any two individuals are captured in their
observable characteristics, the only remaining dierence between the two groups is
"programme partecipation". Thus, it enables us to purge the relationship between
"working in a very risky job" and wage of any observed heterogeneity that would lead
to bias (Heckman et al., 1999).
We carry out the matching procedure based on the results of Rosembaum ad
Rubin (1983): rather than matching on each single characteristics a balancing score
is implemented. More precisely, we make use of the propensity score, which gives
us the propensity to be selected in a very risky job given the full set of observed
characteristics of individuals (Xi): p(Xi)  P(TijXi)2.
To construct the counterfactuals of interest, we estimate a propensity score (probit
regression) of being selected into the treatment "lling a very risky position" using the
set of covariates discussed in the following section. We perform several specication
including and/or excluding some covariates and we achieve a satisfactory selection by
using the covariates depicted in tab.(1). In doing so, we are able to pair to each treated
1The solution advanced by matching is based on the following assumptions:
i Conditional independence assumption (CIA): conditional on the set of observables Xi, the
non-treated outcomes are independent of the participation status: !0
i ? T1jXi.
ii All treated individuals have a counterpart on the non-treated population and anyone consti-
tutes a possible partecipant: 0 < P(Ti = 1jXi) < 1
2Rosembaum and Rubin show that the CIA remains valid if controlling for p(X) instead of X
6individuals i some group of comparable non-treated individuals and then to associate
to the outcome ln! of treated i, a matched outcome d ln!0
i given by the weighted
outcomes of his neighbours in the comparison groups. The matching estimator for















i . As it will be clear in the next section, we use three dif-
ferent matching estimators which dier in how they construct the matched outcome
d ln!0
i . More precisely, we make use of nearest neighbour, stratication (see Dehejia
and Wahba, 1999), and kernel-based matching (see Heckman et al., 1997; 1998). The
rationale behind using three dierent approaches is simply to check that the esti-
mates are not procedure-contingent. Uniformity of estimates' magnitude should allay
concerns about imprecise matching between the treatment and comparison groups.
It is worth pointing out that what we are able to retrieve is only an estimate on
how a particular worker must be compensated for marginal changes in risk. The wage-
risk tradeo estimated is thus a single point on the envelope in g. (1) and this value
varies according to the level of risk considered. Considering very risky jobs, as we do
in this paper, implies that individuals working on such jobs have lower reservation
supply prices of risk and as a result smaller demand prices for safety than the average
worker. Rosen (2004) shows that using data on very risky jobs underestimates the
average demand price for safety at the observed risk levels in the sample. Analogously,
it has to be true that rms oering very risky jobs have a comparative disadvantage at
producing safety, as a result, using data on very risky jobs overestimates the average
supply price of safety (or demand price for risk) for most rms in the economy.
4 Dataset and Summary Statistics
We use a microdata sample from Survey of Household Income and Wealth 2004
(SHIW) of the Bank of Italy. The SHIW is based on a random sample of 8,012 house-
holds, 20,581 individuals. It contains information on both household and individuals.
The leading purpose of this survey is to pick individual nancial information, but it
also contains a lot of individual characteristics such as the highest completed school
degree, gender, age, years of working experience, weekly hours worked, gross yearly
wages, region of residence, etc. Likewise, it includes information on parental educa-
tion, sector and job position. Unfortunately, family background characteristics are
available only for the heads of household. Indeed, we draw a subsample of 1544 heads
of household, full time employed, aged 19 to 78.
7Table 1: Summary statistics of the overall sample.
Variable Mean s.d.






Primary school 0.11 0.32
Secondary school 0.38 0.48
Upper secondary school 0.43 0.49
College 0.06 0.25
Scientic college degree 0.046 0.21
Vocational 0.28 0.45








Father's years of schooling 5.89 4.07
Father unemployed 0.01 0.12
Father blue-collar 0.52 0.49
Mother's years of schooling 5.23 3.80
Mother unemployed 0.56 0.49
Mother blue-collar 0.15 0.36
No. observations 1544
8To construct the propensity score of being selected into the treatment, we consider
the following informational set:
 Socio-demographic characteristics: age, sex, status, nationality and area of
residence. We make use of the canonical partitioning in 4 areas, that is, North-
East, North-West, Middle and South. Whether individuals live in an urban area
is also considered.
 Educational background: dummy variables for the educational level at-
tained. As dataset miss information about precise years of schooling, we make
use of educational degree attained, in particular we consider 4 educational lev-
els: primary, secondary, upper secondary, college, which roughly correspond to
5;8;13;18+ years of schooling respectively . We also take into account whether
individuals have followed a technical undergraduate route, whether have at-
tained a scientic college degree and the score of the degree achieved.
 Wage: although hourly wage is not available in the SHIW dataset, thanks to
information about hours worked we are able to build it as follows:
yearlyearning
monthsworked  weeklyhoursworked  4
We use worker's after-tax wage because it is recorded benets-free; in this way,
we are certain that wage variable is comprised of only base-wage.
 Family backgrounds: We allow for both parental social class and educational
level attained.
Lastly, to construct our risk measure we follow the standard approach in the literature.
We use industry-specic risk measure provided by INAIL (Italian agency for the
insurance against work-related injuries). It re
ects an average of fatalities occurred
in 2004. We consider risky jobs as those which lie above the 70% of the distribution
of injury rate per sector. They belong to the conventional very risky sectors such as
mining, manufacturing, construction and transports (see appendix 1 to see how we
construct the treatment variable). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the above
variables.
5 Results
Table 2 depicts the results obtained by matching estimator considering full sam-
ple and then both manual and non-manual workers3. We only show the estimates
3We perform the matching estimates thanks to PSMATCH2 Stata module v. 3.0.0 (Leuven and
Sianesi, 2003) and atts.ado Stata module (Becker and Ichino, 2002)
9that yield the better balancing between treatment and control groups. Full sample
estimates suggest that there is no wage risk premium on average in the Italian labour
market. A negligible wage premium appears from stratication method, that is bear-
ing the risk is compensating by 0.6% more in terms of hourly wage. The result tends
to be lower with respect to other empirical works carried out for other countries and
with the same sample population (Biddle and Zarkin, 1998 nd a point estimate of
1.6%; Duncan and Holmlund, 1983 nd 2%; Lalive, 2000 obtains an estimate of 1.3%;
Viscusi and Moore, 1987 nds 1.7% and 4.% depending on the type of specication).
Unfortunately, there are no empirical works carried out for Italy in that topic and,
at the same time, no one have used our econometric approach so far, then we lack
for any appropriate comparison. Notwithstanding, we believe our low results, one
one hand, might depend on an overall 
at wage distribution typical of the Italian
labour market (amongst others see Bertola and Ichino, 1995) and, on the other hand,
they might be the consequence of more genuine estimate retrieved by the matching
estimator, which is aimed at removing the amount of wage dierentials not directly
attributable to risk.




Nearest Neighbour - all obs. -0.004 0.034 1299
Kernel density - bwidth (0.06) 0.003 0.023 1299
Stratication 0.006 0.023 1299
manual workers
Nearest Neighbour - cal. (0.0025) 0.028 0.043 666
Kernel density - bwidth (0.06) 0.035 0.031 753
Stratication 0.026 0.032 753
non-manual workers
Nearest Neighbour - cal. (0.004) 0.002 0.064 525
Kernel density - bwidth (0.06) 0.010 0.040 546
Stratication 0.008 0.038 546
y Matching standard errors are bootstrapped (300 replications).
We cannot just limit the analysis on that estimates because the full sample may
include a huge source of heterogeneity (e.g. workers ability, job positions, rm size,
amongst others) and bounding the analysis on that leads surely to biased estimates. In
10order to cope with this heterogeneity and to allow for some labor market segregation
eects we carry out our analysis separately for dierent sub-samples (e. g., Hersch
1998, Herzog and Schlottmann 1990, Sandy and Elliott 1996 carry out a similar
strategy); in particular, we rst investigate whether the magnitude of the wage risk
premium is dissimilar with respect to manual and non-manual workers and further
whether there might be some employer size-wage eect at work.
When we split the sample along the type of occupation such that non-manual work-
ers are those which hold a managerial job, a positive premium emerges. Irrespective
of the matching technique, manual workers in risky jobs gain about 3% compared to
their counterparts in a non-risky position, whereas no or negligible compensating dif-
ferential is detected when we look at non-manual workers, in line with Hersch (1998).
The fact that every matching technique releases similar estimates further strengthens
these ndings.
It is recognized that part of wage dierentials may be explained by rm and/or
establishment size dierentials, i.e., large rms generally pay higher wages than the
small ones for several reasons (see Brown and Medo, 1989; Oi and Idson, 1999). A
component of the above risk premium might be likely associated to heterogeneity in
rm size. Thus, to take into account this fact and to rule out some source of bias
deriving from rm size, we perform a separate analysis for small and medium-large
rms. A more detailed classication would require the orthodox partitioning in three
groups (small, medium, large), unfortunately, owing to lack of observations in our
sample, we are forced to use just those two groups. Nevertheless, such partitioning is
not as bad as it could appear, because it is still able to capture the italian industrial
organization that rely mostly on small rms (rms that employ less than 15 employees)
and relatively little on large rms. We retrieve estimates for both manual and non-
manual workers in small and medium-large rms as reported in table 3.
Empirical ndings on wage dierentials according to employer size-wage theory
seems to be conrmed also for risk premium. As table 3 shows, small rms appear to
pay less and likely to 
atten out any wage premium, whereas medium-large rms only
recognize about 1%. It is noteworthy that within these two groups manual and non-
manual workers premium seems no to follow the path sketched above. In particular,
non-manual workers' wage seems to be higher in small rms. It amounts to about 6%
when one considers nearest neighbour and stratication matching. Unfortunately, we
do not achieve the same correspondence in magnitude across the estimates as before:
kernel matching detects a nearly null wage premium. This drawback may be the result
of the small sample size which does not permit a satisfactory balancing of covariates
between treatment and control groups.
On the other hand, when we consider medium-large rms the picture is wholly




Nearest Neighbour - all obs. -0.003 0.054 519
Kernel density - bwidth (0.06) -0.003 0.038 519
Stratication -0.008 0.039 519
manual workers
Nearest Neighbour - cal. (0.006) -0.006 0.078 310
Kernel density - bwidth (0.06)) -0.003 0.055 354
Stratication? 0.006 0.062 354
non-manual workers
Nearest Neighbour - cal. (0.0035) 0.058 0.180 141
Kernel density - bwidth (0.09) 0.007 0.104 162
Stratication 0.062 0.096 162
MEDIUM-LARGE FIRMS
overall workers
Nearest Neighbour - cal. (0.0025) 0.015 0.049 655
Kernel density - bwidth (0.06) 0.010 0.029 767
Stratication 0.004 0.031 780
manual workers
Nearest Neighbour - cal. (0.0025) 0.015 0.066 262
Kernel density - bwidth (0.06) 0.030 0.045 371
Stratication 0.050 0.038 391
non-manual workers
Nearest Neighbour - all obs. -0.033 0.072 380
Kernel density - bwidth (0.06) -0.001 0.044 380
Stratication -0.014 0.481 380
y Matching standard errors are bootstrapped (300 replications).
? married is not included in the estimation of the p-score to satisfy the balancing property.
12reversed: manual workers gain on average a positive premium ranging 1.5% to 5%,
whereas non-manual workers' estimates display a conter-intuitive negative risk pre-
mium. However, these negative values are informative of the presence of no compen-
sating dierentials. This gures might potentially be explained by the higher rate of
unionization observed in the larger rms: as union tends to favor more the manual
workers in the collective bargaining (and the collective contracts cover mostly manual
jobs) it is likely that they succeed in obtaining a higher premium for this type of jobs.
6 Final Remarks
For nearly thirty years, labour and health economists were striving to nd em-
pirical evidence about the wage-risk tradeo. The bulk of the literature seems to
conrm Adam Smith's intuition about compensating dierentials for occupational
hazard across countries. The econometric approach mainly used so far has been the
conventional wage equation, wherein a more or less sophisticated measure of risk on
the job has been the principal concern on which drawing conclusions. This paper
attempts to put one step forward by testing such old theoretical insight by means
of a quite recent econometric methodology. We estimates wage dierentials between
risky and non-risky jobs in Italy, using a matching estimator. We believe that a
semi-parametric technique is desirable whether inferring causal relationship between
treatment, holding a risky position, and outcome, hourly wage, is the main concern.
One main limit of the paper is likely constituted by the fact of relying on an
industry-specic risk measure which may lead to retrieve inter-industry rather than
risk dierentials. However, as Dorman and Hagstrom (1998) outlined, this is a com-
mon feature of any risk measure because the injury risk typically re
ects industry-level
risk. Moreover, many papers have shown that when one controls for both risk and in-
dustry variables, the magnitude of the risk premium is unaected and still signicant
(for a comprehensive review see Viscusi, 2003).
Our main results can be summarized as follows: i) on average, risk premium is
almost zero; ii) manual workers gain about 3% more, while non-manual workers do not
receive any compensating dierential; iii) small rms tend to recognize a risk premium
only to non-manual workers, while medium-large rms recognize such a premium only
to manual workers. To sum, the paper shows that in Italy wage risk premium is
quite small compared to other countries and not always recognized as hedonic wage
theory would predict. Notwithstanding, a positive premium is present for very risky
positions as manual workers, that as ISTAT investigation depicts (2008) are those that
experienced a signicantly higher injury rate. In this case, the matching estimator
seems to be more appropriate in detecting such a premium because it attempts to
13take o all the dierences in wage coming from heterogeneity across individuals and
not directly imputable to risk.
To answer to the question in the title, we might say that there is no a clear-
cut trend. Although rst results (manual workers risk premium is higher than non-
manual one) are consistent with the theory, it seems that when a ner disaggregation
of labour market aspects is carried out, this trend tends to be vanished (this is the
case of the small rms). These mixed results lead us to wonder whether there exists
something else at work. Safety-enhancing expenditure by rms explanation would
seem unsatisfactory given the persistence of injuries and deaths in the workplace even
in the small rms. Lower unionization rate in small rms might be a more reasonable
explanation since a weaker workers' bargaining power should usually lead to lower
wage dierentials of any kind. If this is the case, besides the reduction of injury
exposure, equalizing risk premium opportunities across workers should then be the
main important policy intervention task.
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16Appendix 1
Table 4: Injury rate per NACE (Rev.) sector, 2004 y
Sector Injury rate 1000 workers
Agriculture and shing (A+B) 87
Mining, manufacturing, electricity (C+D+E) 109.75
Construction (F) 178
Wholesale and retail trade, Hotels and restaurant (G+H) 92
Transport(I) 116
Financial intermediation (J) 10
Real estate(K) 64
Public administration,education, health, other social activities (L+M+N+O) 63.25
y Source: our calculations based on INAIL data, www.Inail.it
Table 4 depicts our calculations about injury rate per 1000 workers per sector.
Risky jobs, that lie above the 70% of injury rate distribution are represented by
mining, manufacturing, construction and transports.
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